











SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2009-062 
Interest Rate Dynamics 










* Guttenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 




This research was supported by the Deutsche 





SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 




















































































 Interest Rate Dynamics and Monetary Policy
Implementation in Switzerland
Puriya Abbassi
Gutenberg Universit at Mainz
Dieter Nautz
Freie Universit at Berlin
Christian J. Offermanns
Freie Universit at Berlin
December 4, 2009
Abstract
The maturity of the operational target of monetary policy is a distinguishing feature
of the SNB's operational framework of monetary policy. While most central banks
use targets for the overnight rate to signal the policy-intended interest rate level, the
SNB announces a target range for the three-month Libor. This paper investigates
the working and the consequences of the SNB's unique operational framework for the
behavior of Swiss money market rates before and during the nancial crisis.
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The way monetary policy is implemented by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) diers from
the procedures of most other central banks. Since the introduction of the SNB's new
monetary policy framework in 1999, the maturity of the operational target of monetary
policy has been a distinguishing feature of the SNB's operational framework. While other
central banks use more or less explicit targets for the overnight rate to signal the policy-
intended interest rate level, the SNB announces a target range for the three-month (3M)
Libor.1 This paper investigates the working and the consequences of the SNB's unique
operational framework for the behavior of Swiss money market rates before and during
the nancial crisis.
Following Jordan and Kugler (2004) and Swiss National Bank (2007), a major advan-
tage of shifting the emphasis from the overnight rate to the 3M Libor is that it enables
the SNB to react to nancial shocks without having to declare a change in the stance
of monetary policy. Therefore, overnight rate and three-month rate targeting might lead
to similar outcomes in normal times, when large shocks are absent and spreads between
interbank money market rates are low and stable. During the nancial crisis, however, the
behavior of Swiss interest rates suggests that the SNB's three-month rate targeting might
have some additional features that could make it even interesting for other central banks.
The SNB manages the 3M Libor through both, words and deeds. First of all, the
announced target rate itself should have an inuence on the Libor. Moreover, since the
current Libor will also depend on the expected path of the target range, the management
of market expectations via e.g. interviews and speeches is of particular importance for the
SNB, see e.g. Schlegel (2009). The SNB's communication of current and future target
rates is substantiated by a very active liquidity management. The most important policy
instrument are daily repo auctions with one-week maturity. The repo volume allotted in
these auctions determines the level of reserves and, in addition, the pre-announced repo
rate governs the one-week repo rate in the interbank money market. As a result, the repo
rate can be seen as the SNB's intermediate policy rate to manage the 3M Libor.
1The London Interbank Oered Rate (Libor) is an indicative interest rate at which an individual
contributor panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting interbank oers
in reasonable market size, just prior to 12 a.m. CET. It serves as the main instrument for benchmarking
short-term rates and is used as the basis for settlement of interest rate contracts on many of the world's
major futures and options exchanges. For further details see www.bbalibor.com.
1In accordance with the central role of the 1W repo rate and the 3M Libor in the SNB's
operational framework, our empirical analysis focuses on how these interest rates respond
to various policy-relevant factors including e.g. deviations of the Libor from the target,
changes in risk premia, market expectations, and the SNB's supply of reserves. In order
to capture a possible change in interest rate dynamics and the SNB's monetary policy,
both interest rate equations are estimated for the period before and after the outbreak of
the nancial crisis separately.
Our paper builds on earlier empirical contributions on the implementation of Swiss
monetary policy. The closest reference to our work is Jordan and Kugler (2004) who
also employ error-correction-type equations to explore the adjustment of Libor rates to
deviations from the target. Jordan, Ranaldo and S oderlind (2009) propose a regime-
dependent model to allow for a dierent response of the Libor before and during the
nancial crisis. Their ndings conrm that repo operations and changes in the target rate
are instrumental for the implementation of the SNB's monetary policy.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a rst look at the data
and discusses several features of the SNB's operational framework. Section 3 presents
the empirical results obtained for the adjustment equations of the repo rate and the 3M
Libor before and during the nancial crisis. In order to shed more light on the role of
three-month rate targets for the control of three-month rates, we investigate how the ECB
managed interest rates during the nancial crisis. Section 4 gives a summary of our main
results and concludes.
2 Three-Month Rate Targeting
In this section, we will have a rst look at the implementation of the SNB's three-month
rate targeting. Section 2.1 describes how targets for the three-month rate are set and
provides a preliminary assessment of their empirical performance. In Section 2.2 we discuss
the specic role of interest rate expectations and the SNB's target corridor. Section 2.3
describes how the SNB uses regular open market operations to steer the three-month rate
within the corridor. Section 2.4 compares the interest rate management of the SNB and
the ECB during the nancial crisis.
22.1 A First Look at the Data
At each Thursday in the third week of March, June, September and December the SNB
provides an assessment and addresses its decisions, concerns, views and outlook about
monetary and economic developments. In particular, a target corridor of about 100 basis
points is announced for the 3M Libor where the aimed level is typically determined by
the middle of the corridor.2 Target changes have always been communicated with an
immediate eect.
Figure 1: The target range of the SNB
Notes: The shaded area refers to the crisis period as of 9 August, 2007.
Figure 1 displays the 3M Libor (r), the target corridor and the target rate (r) for daily
data from 3 January 2000 to 30 June 2009. Apparently, controllability of the three-month
rate has not been a major problem for the SNB since the Libor followed its aimed level
closely. Over the complete sample period, the average deviation of the Libor from the
target rate is small, even during the nancial crisis, see Table 1. The standard deviation
of 12 basis points indicates that there are also periods of marked deviations from the
target. Yet, with only a few exceptions, the Libor always remained within the target
corridor set by the SNB. These exceptions are all related to the unexpected and huge
target changes in October and November 2008 in the aftermath of the Lehman breakdown.3
2Exceptionally, the SNB deviated from this rule due to technical reasons. In 6 March, 2003, for instance,
the SNB temporary narrowed down the target range from 100 to 75 basis points and intended to keep the
3M Libor rate at around 0.25%, i.e. at the lower end of the new target range.
3Starting in 8 October 2008, the 3M Libor topped its upper bound for a period of roughly 10 days.
With the unexpected 50 basis point change on 6 November 2008, and the 100 basis point change on 20
November 2008, the 3M Libor again exceeded the ceiling of its corridor each for a single day. This is (at
least for the two latter cases) due to the timing of the Libor xing which has been prior to the decision
3Although both mean and standard deviation of the spread have increased, preliminary data
analysis already indicates that the SNB's three-month rate targeting even worked during
the nancial crisis.
Table 1: Libor spread: descriptive statistics
r   r
Sample Mean Median SD Obs. # Out
3 Jan 2000 { 8 Aug 2007 0.02 0.01 0.10 1982 0
9 Aug 2007 { 30 Jun 2009 0.10 0.06 0.14 495 12
Notes: r denotes the 3M Libor, r
 refers to the SNB's target rate. "# out" captures
the number of days on which the 3M Libor is outside of the target range.
2.2 Rate Expectations and the Target Corridor
If policy is implemented via a target for a particular interest rate, large and persistent
deviations of that rate from its target must be avoided since those lead either to wrong
signals about the intended rate or question the ability of the central bank to keep interest
rates on track, see e.g. Hassler and Nautz (2008). Typically, central banks augment point
targets for interest rates by a target corridor in order to deemphasize small and irrelevant
deviations from the target. In case of overnight rate targeting, the corridor is often dened
by the rates of standing facilities which bound the volatility of the overnight rate in a very
simple and ecient way. In particular, with standing facilities the overnight rate will not
leave its corridor simply due to arbitrage reasons. At rst glance, the implementation of
monetary policy via overnight rate and three-month rate targeting seem to be very similar
since both approaches involve interest rate targets and corridors. However, if the emphasis
of monetary policy is shifted from the overnight rate to a longer-term interest rate, this is
not the whole story. For the SNB's operational framework, the role of rate expectations
and the rationale of an interest rate corridor are dierent.
Consider, for example, the deviations of the 3M Libor from the target in 2006 dis-
played in Figure 2. Obviously, these marked and persistent target deviations do not
indicate bad communication or a failure of interest rate control. In contrast, it is a direct
announcements.
4Figure 2: Target deviations in times of rate change expectations
Notes: The dashed black line represents the SNB's target rate for the 3M Libor,
and the dotted grey lines represent the upper and lower bound of the target range,
respectively. The solid black line refers to the 3M Libor while the solid grey line repre-
sents the target rate that has been adjusted for market participants' rate expectations
implied by the 3M future rate.
consequence of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure that an anticipated and
well-communicated change of the three-month rate target must lead to expectations-driven
target deviations. In contrast to overnight rates, the three-month rate cannot simply stay
on the old target level until the day of the rate change.4
This distinguishing feature of three-month rate targeting has two important implica-
tions. First, it provides a further rationale for the announcement and the width of a target
corridor. Provided that target rate changes do not exceed 50 basis points, a corridor of
100 basis points guarantees that the three-month rate will be on target even immediately
before an anticipated rate change. Second, in case of overnight rates, expected changes
of the target rate can only be important several days before the implementation of the
interest rate change. In contrast, as long as regular central bank meetings are scheduled
at least every three months, rate expectations inuence Swiss' three-month rates perma-
nently, at each day between two meetings. Therefore, deviations of the three-month rate
from the current target are not a feasible measure to evaluate the current interest rate
level and the success of the targeting eorts by the central bank.
4Many overnight-rate targeting central banks found it dicult to keep the overnight rate close to its
target in times of rate change expectations. The ECB, for example, changed its operational framework in
2004 in order to stop the disturbing impact of rate change expectations on its liquidity management, see
Hassler and Nautz (2008).
5A more appropriate measure for the policy intended three-month rate, e r
t, is a convex
combination of the current and the expected future target rate:
e r
t = r
t + wt(ft   r
t); (1)
where ft denotes the expected future target rate, and wt represents a weighting factor. This
weight increases (linearly) from zero to one as the expected subsequent target rate becomes
more relevant over time. In the following, we use the interest rate on the (three-month)
next future to proxy the expected future target rate. Using the future rate to calculate the
implicit policy intended level of the three-month rate assumes that market expectations
are generally in line with the plans of the SNB. Figure 2 shows the expectations-adjusted
three-month rate target and the actual three-month rate for the time period from 2006
until the beginning of the nancial crisis.5 The small deviations between both interest
rates reveal that three-month rate targeting worked particulary well in this period.
Shifting the focus of monetary policy from overnight rates to longer-term rates increases
the role of rate expectations and, thus, the importance of the central bank's expectations
management. The SNB governs market expectations on upcoming target changes in sev-
eral ways, including speeches and interviews, see e.g. Schlegel (2009). Yet, the assumption
of perfect anticipation of interest rate changes might be too strong. Following Jordan,
Ranaldo and S oderlind (2009), we therefore include a measure of interest surprises into
our empirical analysis. According to Hamilton (2009), daily three-month future rates
capture daily changes in markets expectations of central banks near-term policy rate.
Therefore, our surprise variable, surpr, is dened as the change in the three-month future
on the day of SNB's regular monetary policy assessment meetings and zero otherwise.
2.3 The Repo Auctions of the SNB and the Repo Rate
In addition to the management of interest rate expectations, repo auctions are the SNB's
main instrument to steer the 3M Libor.6 The results and renancing conditions in these
auctions determine the liquidity situation and, thus, the interest rates in the interbank
money market. Probably reecting both, the SNB's greater exibility in the short-term
money market (compare Baltensperger, Hildebrand and Jordan, 2007) and the more am-
5See appendix for the complete picture of the expectations-adjusted three-month rate target.
6See Kraenzlin and Schlegel (2009) for a comprehensive survey of the SNB's operational framework and
an empirical analysis of banks' bidding behavior in repo auctions.
6bitious operational target, the SNB is rather active in the money market. In the last years
repo transactions with various maturities have been conducted on a daily basis. The most
prevalent auction format are xed rate tenders with a maturity of one week.7
Figure 3: The SNB's policy instrument
Notes: The shaded area refers to the crisis period as of 9 August, 2007.
In a xed rate tender, the SNB pre-announces the repo rate and banks simply bid
the renancing volume they like to achieve at that rate. Since banks' bidding behavior
depend on the cost of alternative renancing opportunities, the xed repo rate set by the
SNB has a direct inuence on the 1W repo rate at the secondary market, see Figure 3.
As a result, the one-week repo rate anchors the term structure of interest rates and can
be seen as a starting point of the SNB's monetary transmission process. In the following
empirical analysis of Swiss interest rate dynamics, we will use the repo rate rather than the
auction rate as the SNB's policy rate because the secondary market rate repo also reects
the impact of other monetary policy actions including the volume of allotted reserves or
additional ne-tuning operations.8
The SNB's Supply of Reserves
If banks' total bids exceed the SNB's intended supply of reserves, the SNB rations all
bids above a minimum amount proportionally. Following Jordan and Kugler (2004), our
empirical analysis of the SNB's interest rate management considers the possible impact of
the SNB's allotment decisions.
7From 2001 to 2003 one-week repo auctions were used in 27 % of the auctions, the SNB has used this
maturity in approximately 90% of the cases ever since 2004, see Schlegel (2009).
8For instance, in the period after 6 October 2008, the widened spread between the 1W repo rate and
7Figure 4: Bids and allotments in repo auctions
Notes: Right scale: the solid black line represents the total amount of bids submitted
to the SNB's repo auctions by participating banks, whereas the dashed grey line refers
to the total allotment of the SNB. Left scale: the solid grey line represents the cover
to bid ratio, i.e. the ratio between total allotment and total bids.
Data on the SNB renancing auctions is available from 8 January 2001 onwards. The
upper part of Figure 4 depicts the aggregate allotment volume and the total bid amount
of all repo operations with one week maturity.9 Since 2004, the bid volumes have become
larger because of the increased importance of one-week repo auctions in the set of the SNB's
policy instruments. During the nancial crisis, bids decreased because banks anticipated
the full allotment policy of the SNB. In the lower part of the Figure, we displayed the
resulting cover to bid ratio, cbr, dened as the ratio between total allotment and total
bids. Note that this ratio is far from constant and, typically, not easy to predict from
the perspective of a single bank. In particular, there is no obvious upward trend in the
cover-to-bid ratio. In contrast to the ECB, the SNB did not experience that banks started
to increasingly exaggerate their bids in order to circumvent the rationing, see Nautz and
Oechssler (2006). One explanation for the working of the SNB's xed rate tender format
is suggested by the time series of the spread between the xed rate and the related market
rate (repo), see Schlegel (2009). Figure 3 shows that the spread between both interest
rates has been small but rather volatile and with changing sign. Therefore, overbidding
in SNB's repo auctions might have been avoided because banks could not be sure to make
prots by reselling excess reserves on the secondary market.
the SNB's repo rate as depicted in Figure 3 reects the impact of such additional measures.
9On some few occasions, the SNB did not perform a one-week repo auction. In all these cases, we lled
the data with the repo rate of the prevailing maturity. Following Jordan and Kugler (2004), there is no
dierence in the impact of repo auctions with dierent maturities.
82.4 Interest Rate Targeting in the Financial Crisis: SNB and ECB
Since August 2007, the environment of an extreme nervousness among money market
players started to have a great impact on global money markets. As a result, the concerns
about liquidity, market and credit risk exposure - as reected by the spread between the
3M Libor and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate - skyrocketed for major currencies, see
Figure 5.
Figure 5: Risk premia in the nancial crisis
Notes: Following Taylor and Williams (2009), we dene the risk premium as the
spread between the Libor and the OIS rate. The rst vertical line denotes the begin-
ning of the crisis as of 9 August, 2007. The second vertical line represents the failure
of Lehman on 15 September, 2008.
During the nancial crisis many central banks experienced unusual diculties in im-
plementing the policy-intended levels of short-term interest rates. For example, before the
crisis the spread between the ECB's operational target, i.e. the overnight rate Eonia, and
the policy rate, i.e. the minimum bid rate of the main renancing operation, has been very
small and to a large extent under the ECB's control.10 In this calm period, risk premia
were small and future short-term rates rather easy to predict. The spread between the 3M
Euribor and the Eonia was under control and in line with policy intentions. This picture
changed dramatically in the course of the nancial crisis, see Figure 6. The massive liq-
uidity injections of the ECB certainly helped to stabilize the banking sector but decoupled
the Eonia from the minimum bid rate. Since the Lehman breakdown, banks have used
the ECB's deposit facility on a large scale to deposit excess reserves. As a result, the
10Before the crisis, even target deviations of only a few basis points lead to discussions about the ECB's
monetary setup, see e.g. Linzert and Schmidt (2008).
9deposit rate has become the new reference rate for the Eonia. Although the ECB did not
ocially announce a new interest rate targeting regime, there is certainly an increased
concern about the level of longer-term money market rates. The observed change in the
ECB's interest rate management might have led to some confusion of market participants
about the policy intended interest rate level.
Figure 6: Swiss and euro area interest rates in the crisis
Notes: The vertical dashed line refers to 15 October 2008, when the ECB shifted its
focus on longer-term interest rates by conducting longer-term repo auctions as xed
rate tenders with full allotment.
Compared with the ECB, the changes in the SNB's operational framework stirred by
the crisis have been relatively small. In particular, the SNB did not abandon its operational
target. Mean and volatility of the spread between the 3M Libor and its target have only
slightly increased during the nancial crisis, see Section 2.1. Figure 6 shows that the SNB
decreased its repo rate dramatically in order to keep the 3M Libor close to its target. The
transparency of the SNB's interest rate policy might have contributed to keep the risk
premia revealed by the Libor-OIS spreads relatively low, see Figure 5.
3 Monetary Policy Implementation and Interest Rate Dy-
namics: Empirical Results
In accordance with the SNB's operational framework of monetary policy, the following
empirical analysis focusses on the dynamics and adjustment processes of the 1W repo rate
and the 3M Libor. For both interest rates, error-correction type equations are employed
to estimate how the interest rates respond to various policy-relevant factors, see Jordan
and Kugler (2004). Due to data availability, we use daily data ranging from 8 January
102001 until 30 June 2009. To control for the eects of the nancial crisis on interest rate
dynamics, both interest rate equations are estimated for the period before and after 9
August, 2007 separately.
3.1 The Dynamics of the Policy Instrument
We begin with the estimation of the adjustment equation of the SNB's policy rate, i.e. the
1W repo rate (of the secondary money market), which is specied as follows:











'jrepot j + lncbrt +  surprt +  + ut:
Following Section 2, the 1W repo rate (repo) should respond to the Libor spread (r   e r),
i.e. to deviations of the 3M Libor (r) from the expectations adjusted target rate (e r), see
Section 2.2. A second error-correction term is suggested by the expectations hypothesis
of the term structure which implies that the term spread (r   repo) is stationary even if
the level of interest rates are non-stationary.11 Non-stationary interest rates of dierent
maturity are only co-integrated if risk premia are stationary. According to Section 2.4,
stationarity of risk premia has become questionable during the nancial crisis. While
changes in the level of risk, measured as Libor-OIS spread, have been virtually negligi-
ble before the nancial crisis, large swings of risk could have aected the interest rate
management of central banks since the onset of the turmoil. The adjustment equation
of the 1W repo rate therefore controls for changes in the risk premium of the 3M Libor.
In line with Jordan and Kugler (2004), the 1W repo rate may respond to the allotment
decisions made in the SNB's repo auctions. Following Section 2.3, large cover-to-bid ratios
(cbr) indicate a generous supply of liquidity which should lead to a decrease in the repo
rate. Finally, we follow Jordan, Ranaldo and S oderlind (2009) and control for the eect
of policy surprises (surpr) dened by the change of the future rate observed at the day of
a policy meeting.
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results obtained for the adjustment equation of
the 1W repo rate before and during the nancial crisis.12 The results suggest several
11In fact, while unit root tests indicate that both interest rates are integrated of order one, the term
spread can be assumed to be stationary. For similar results for euro area and U.S. interest rates, see e.g.
Nautz and Oermanns (2007) and Sarno and Thornton (2003).
12A complete presentation of the estimation results is shown in the Appendix.
11conclusions regarding the SNB's implementation of monetary policy. First of all, the
adjustment coecient 1 is statistically signicant and plausibly signed for both sample
periods. As expected, the SNB adjusts the 1W repo rate in response to observed deviations
of the 3M Libor from the target rate. In particular, if the Libor exceeds the expectations-
adjusted target, the 1W repo rate is lowered to bring the three-month rate down. The
response of the repo rate might have been even stronger since the nancial crisis, probably
indicating increased eorts of the SNB to keep the Libor close to its target.
Table 2: The adjustment equation of the SNB's policy instrument
Variable Coecient Sample
pre-crisis crisis


























Notes: The table refers to Equation (2):
repot = (r   e r
)t 1 + (r   repo)t 1 +
5 X
j=1
jriskt j + lncbrt +  surprt + ::: + ut:
;
 ;
 indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses
are computed according to Newey and West (1987) . The pre-crisis sample runs from 3
January 2000 to 8 August 2007, the crisis sample ends in 30 June 2009. The full set of
estimation results for this equation can be found in Table B.1 in the appendix.
By contrast, the adjustment coecient of the term spread () clearly diers before and
during the nancial crisis. Before the crisis, the estimated response of the repo rate to the
term spread is in line with the predictions of the expectations theory of the term structure.
During the crisis, however, the estimate of ^  is not signicant and even implausibly signed.
In the nancial crisis, increases in the 3M Libor were certainly not due to expected future
increases of the 1W repo rate but resulted from increases in risk premia. Therefore, the
breakdown of the standard expectations-based equilibrium relation between the 1W repo
rate and the 3M Libor reects the SNB's active interest rate management via the 1W repo
rate.
12In both periods there is a signicant reaction of the repo rate to changes in the risk
premium. Interestingly, the long-run eect of changes in risk on the repo rate,
P5
j=1 j,
is largely unaected by the crisis. In both periods, increases in the risk premium were
followed by a decreasing repo rate. Given the structural stability of the SNB's response
to changes in risk, the large and persistent risk premia during the crisis explain a major
part of the behavior of repo rates.
As expected, large cover-to-bid ratios indicate a generous liquidity supply and lead to
decreasing repo rates in the pre-crisis sample. In the crisis, this plausible eect disappears
because cover-to-bid ratios were typically one as a result of the full allotment policy of
the SNB. Finally, we nd no signicant impact of the surprise variable on the repo rate.
This can be partly explained by the maturity mismatch between the one week rate and
the surprise measure which recurs to the three-month next future. However, it also shows
that the one week rate carries only little information about the monetary policy stance,
and thus, is little aected by the SNB's longer-term assessments.
3.2 The Dynamics of the Operational Target
Let us now turn to the empirical analysis of the 3M Libor dynamics. Similar to Jordan
and Kugler (2004) and the adjustment equation employed for the repo rate, the analysis
of the 3M Libor dynamics is based on an error-correction-type adjustment equation:
rt = (rt 1   e r











 jrt j +  surprt +  + vt:
The response of rt to the error-correction terms reects the two channels, words and deeds,
of the SNB's interest rate management. First, a successful expectations management of
the SNB should imply that the 3M Libor adjusts signicantly to the expectation-adjusted
target rate e r
t. Second, if the SNB can actually inuence the 3M Libor via the repo rate,
there should be a signicant response of the 3M Libor to the repo rate via the term spread,
(r   repo).
The SNB announces the conditions of the repo auction at 9 a.m. CET on each opera-
tion day and invites banks to submit their bids. The auction is closed at 9.10 a.m. CET
and individual results are being announced at (roughly) 9.20 a.m. CET including both
the total bid and total allotment. The Libor xing occurs at 12 a.m. CET.
13Table 3: The adjustment equation for the 3M Libor
Variable Coecient Sample
pre-crisis crisis
























Notes: The table refers to Equation (3):
rt = (r   e r
)t 1 + (r   repo)t 1 +
5 X
j=1
 jrt j +  surprt + ::: + vt:
The full set of estimation results for this equation can be found in Table B.2 in the Appendix.
Note that the R
2 in the crisis period is inated by dummy variables capturing two outliers
in November and December 2008. For further notes, see Table 2.
Table 3 summarizes the results obtained for the adjustment equation of the 3M Libor
before and during the crisis. For both periods, the signicant and plausibly signed error-
correction coecient  related to the expectations-adjusted target rate clearly indicates
the existence of the "words channel" of monetary policy implementation. Remarkably,
the size of the coecient is almost the same in both periods. The channel of steering the
three-month rate by signals about the current and future level of the target rate seems to
be unaected by the nancial crisis. Focusing on the dynamics of the adjustment equation
for the 3M Libor, the half-life period of a shock to the expectations-adjusted target rate
e r is about 19 days before and 23 days during the crisis.
The adjustment coecient  of the 3M Libor to the term spread is signicantly negative
in the crisis period and insignicant before. This suggests that the role of the 1W repo
rate and, thus, of the \deeds channel" of monetary policy implementation has increased
in the crisis period. Note that the signicant adjustment of the 3M Libor to the repo
rate cannot be explained by simple expectations eects. In fact, a typical nding of the
empirical literature on interest rate dynamics is that longer-term interest rates are weakly
exogenous and do not adjust to interest rates with shorter maturities, see e.g. Sarno and
Thornton (2003) and Hassler and Wolters (2001).
14Our empirical results suggest that the working of the SNB's interest rate manage-
ment in the nancial crisis can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that an increase in the
risk premium (risk > 0) had caused an unwished increase in the 3M Libor above its
expectations-adjusted target, i.e. r   e r > 0. According to Table 2, the SNB responds to
the equilibrium deviation with a decrease in the 1W repo rate which in turn will increase
the term spread r   repo. Finally, Table 3 shows how the increased term spread helps to
bring the 3M Libor back to target.
Two further results shown in Table 3 are worth noting. First, there has been a sig-
nicant increase in the persistence of the 3M Libor during the crisis. Second, while the
surprise variable played no role for the dynamics of the repo rate, our estimates show that
monetary policy surprises have a signicant impact on the three-month rate. This con-
rms the dierent functions of the two interest rates: it is the three-month rate through
which the SNB's monetary policy stance is transmitted, and not the one week rate.
3.3 The Interest Rate Management of the ECB
In order to shed more light on the SNB's approach of monetary policy implementation,
let us now compare the Swiss interest rate dynamics during the nancial crisis with those
recently observed in the euro area. In the course of the nancial crisis, the ECB shifted
the attention increasingly to the management of longer-term money market rates, like the
3M Euribor. In the following, we therefore investigate to what extent the ECB's monetary
policy implementation has become equivalent to the three-month rate targeting approach
of the SNB.
Since the beginning of the nancial crisis in August 2007, the interest rate management
of the ECB can be divided into two regimes. In the rst year of the crisis, until the Lehman
breakdown in September 2008, the ECB still tried to keep the Eonia close to its key policy
rate, i.e. the minimum bid rate of its main renancing operation (MRO). However, the
ECB also began to be explicitly concerned about stabilizing longer-term money market
rates. To that aim, the ECB increased drastically the volume and frequency of its longer-
term renancing operations (LTROs). While the share of LTROs in total renancing
was 33% in the rst half of 2007, it rose to more than 60% in the beginning of 2008,
see European Central Bank (2009) (p. 79). All these LTROs had been conducted as
variable rate tenders. In contrast to MROs, however, the LTROs were performed without
a minimum bid rate. Therefore, the ECB sent no signal about the intended longer-term
repo rate and thus, its impact on Euribor rates has been limited.
15From October 2008 onwards, in the aftermath of the Lehman event, banks became more
and more reluctant to lend to each other and the distribution of liquidity was severely
impaired. Even solvent banks were observed to experience problems with renancing
through the interbank money market. As a result, banks increased their recourse to the
ECB's renancing operations and the average MRO interest rate jumped to more than
70 basis points above the minimum bid rate. Moreover, Libor-OIS spreads revealed that
particularly the 3M Euribor was inated by a huge risk premium. In view of these extreme
disturbances, the ECB partly abandoned the overnight rate Eonia as its operational target
(see Section 2.4) and adjusted its operational framework in several ways, see European
Central Bank (2009). In particular, the ECB switched from the variable rate to the xed
rate tender format with full allotment in all renancing operations. Moreover, the repo
rate set by the ECB was the same for all maturities. Therefore, from 15 October 2008
onwards, by announcing a xed rate for liquidity provision in the three-month horizon,
the ECB basically published a target for the 3M Euribor.
Table 4: The adjustment of the 3M Euribor in the crisis
Variable Coecient
Euribor Spread var 0:002
(0:52) in variable rate tender period
Term Spread var  0:002
(0:82) in variable rate tender period
Euribor Spread fix  0:012
(3:18)

in xed rate tender period
R2 0:64
Obs: 487
Notes: The table summarizes the main estimation results of the adjustment equation for the















t equals one in the xed rate tender period from 15 October 2008 to 30 June 2009,
and zero otherwise. Note that the term spread in the xed rate tender regime is identical to
the Euribor spread during that period. The full set of estimation results for this equation
can be found in Table B.3 in the Appendix. For further notes, see Table 2.
Table 4 shows the estimated adjustment equation of the 3M Euribor obtained for the
crisis period. For sake of comparison, the specication follows the equation employed
for the 3M Libor in the previous section. In particular, we used the minimum bid rate
(MBR) as the ECB's policy instrument and the marginal LTRO rate as implicit target for
16the three-month rate. Taking into account the ECB's switch from variable to xed rate
tenders, we use an indicator variable that equals one during the xed rate tender regime
starting in 15 October 2008, and zero before. The insignicant adjustment coecients
of both error-correction terms show that the ECB's impact on the 3M Euribor has been
only weak in the variable rate tender regime. By contrast, the adjustment coecient
of the xed rate regime is highly signicant and plausibly signed. In contrast to the
SNB, the ECB not only sends signals about the policy intended level of the 3M Euribor.
Rather, using xed rate tenders with full allotment, the ECB directly intervenes in the
three-month money market segment. Apparently, the introduction of xed rate tenders
together with the commitment of full allotment at the target rate signicantly improved
the ECB's control over longer-term money market rates.
4 Concluding Remarks
Over the last 10 years, a distinguishing feature of the SNB's monetary policy framework
has been the announcement of a target corridor for the 3M Libor. This paper investigated
the empirical relevance of this target for the interest rate dynamics of the 3M Libor and
1W repo rate, i.e. the SNB's main policy rate. Our empirical results show that the SNB
controls the 3M Libor through both, words and deeds. On the one hand, we nd a
signicant response of the 3M Libor to deviations from its expectations-adjusted target
rate. On the other hand, the repo rate had been actively used to counteract increases in
the Libor caused by risk premia.
While standard overnight rate and three-month rate targeting should lead to similar
results in normal times, the nancial crisis showed that the SNB's approach to monetary
policy implementation might have some additional features. In particular, the trans-
parency of the SNB's interest rate policy during the crisis might have contributed to keep
the risk premia revealed by the Libor-OIS spreads relatively low.
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18A Figures
Figure A.1: The three-month next future rate
Notes: The solid black line refers to the three-month future rate. The dotted grey
lines represent the target range for the 3M Libor. The dashed black line denote the
SNB's target rate. The shaded area refers to the crisis period as of 9 August, 2007.
Figure A.2: The expectation adjusted target
Notes: The solid black line refers to the target rate that has been adjusted for market
participants' rate expectations implied by the three-month future rate. The dotted
grey lines represent the target range for the 3M Libor. The dashed black line denote
the SNB's target rate. The shaded area refers to the crisis period as of 9 August,
2007.
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One-week Repo Rate Dynamics
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Table B.1: The adjustment equation of the SNB's policy instrument
Variable Coecient Sample
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Notes: Estimated coecients of Equation (2).
;
 ;
 indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%,
10% level. Absolute t-statistics are computed according to Newey and West (1987). The
pre-crisis sample runs from 3 January 2000 to 8 August 2007, and the crisis sample ends in
30 June 2009.
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Table B.2: The adjustment equation of the 3M Libor
Variable Coecient Sample
pre-crisis crisis


































































































Notes: Estimated coecients of Equation (3). Note that the R
2 in the crisis period is inated
by dummy variables capturing two outliers in November and December 2008. For further
notes, see Table B.1.
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Notes: Estimated coecients of an equation analogously to (3) for the 3M Euribor. Note
that the term spread in the xed rate tender regime is identical to the Euribor spread during
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